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Tim Van Baak | 484b5a130d |
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---
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title: The Indissolubility of Marriage: The Theological Tradition of the East
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author: Alexander Schmemann
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date: 1967-10-18
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source: https://archive.org/details/bondofmarriageec00bass/
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comment: Archive.org says this paper was delivered at an interdenominational symposium sponsored by the Canon Law Society of America and held at the Center for Continuing Education at the University of Notre Dame. The ["Comment and Discussion"](#comment) section is, I therefore assume, a Catholic response to Schmemann's article.
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---
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ALEXANDER SCHMEMANN*
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\* Dean of St. Vladimir’s Theological Seminary, Tuckahoe, New York. Father Schmemann is the author of *Sacraments and Orthodoxy* (1965), and *The World as Sacrament* (1967).
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## [I.](#I) {#I}
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I must begin this paper by stating the initial paradox of
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the Eastern Orthodox approach toward marriage. On the
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one hand, the Orthodox Church explicitly affirms the
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indissolubility of marriage;[^1] yet, on the other hand, she
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seems to accept divorce and has in her canonical tradition
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several regulations concerning it.[^2]
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How can these apparently contradictory positions be reconciled? And, first of
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all, what does this paradox mean? Is it an uneasy compromise
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between the maximalism of theory and the minimalism of practice, that famous “economy” which the
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Orthodox seem to invoke so often in order to solve all
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kinds of difficulties? I think that no answer can be given
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to any of these questions before an attempt is made to
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understand the complexity of the Orthodox teaching about
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marriage.
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[^1]: See F. Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (London, 1923), pp. 384 ff.; Bishop Sylvester, *Orthodox Dogmatic Theology*, 4 vols. (Kiev, 1897), pp. 539 ff.
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[^2]: N. Suvorov, *Kurs Tserkovnago Prava* (Manual of Canon Law), (Yaroslave, 1889), II, 331 ff.
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A western Christian may not realize that this teaching
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has never taken the form of a consistent and systematic
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doctrine in which the liturgical rites, the canonical
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requirements, the theological interpretations and finally the
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demands of reality would be expressed within a unified
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framework. Does it mean, however, that there is no
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Orthodox doctrine of marriage, doctrine which would in turn
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serve as a norm for practice? No! But it means that this
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doctrine has not been given a “juridical” formulation and
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remains, as much of Eastern Orthodox theology in general,
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in the state of affirmations rather than explanations, is
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expressed more often in liturgical rites rather than canonical
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texts, and finally, serves as a guiding principle rather
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than explicit legislation.
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The starting point for any elucidation of this doctrine is,
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of necessity, in the Orthodox understanding of matrimony
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as *sacrament*. Here one must keep in mind that in the
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Orthodox Church, sacramental theology has never been
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formulated in clear and precise definitions as in the West.
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It is true that in postpatristic manuals of dogmatics much
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of the western approach to sacraments has been rather
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uncritically adopted. This “westernized” theology, however,
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so obviously contradicts the earlier and more normative
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Orthodox tradition, that of the Fathers and of the liturgy,
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that it cannot be accepted as an adequate expression of
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the Orthodox “lex credendi.” When speaking of the
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sacrament of matrimony, we must, therefore, see it within a
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wider perspective of the Orthodox meaning of sacraments
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in general.
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It is sufficient for our present subject to stress that the
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sacrament or *mysterion* in the Orthodox tradition implies
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necessarily the idea of a *transformation*, of a “*passage*”
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from the old into the new and, therefore, an eschatological
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connotation.[^3] The sacrament is always the passage from
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“this world” into the Kingdom of God as already
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inaugurated by Christ, and of which the Church herself is
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the “sacrament” in “this eon.” Thus, in the baptismal
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death and resurrection, man is not simply absolved of his
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original sin but is truly “transferred” from the old creation
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into the new. In the sacrament of anointment, he is
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introduced into the Kingdom inaugurated on the day of Pente-
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cost by the Holy Spirit. In the Eucharist the Church
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fulfills herself by ascending to the Kingdom of God, to “His
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table in His Kingdom.” All sacraments are considered
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eschatological in the sense that they manifest and
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communicate in this world the reality of the world to come.
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Hence, and this is the second important observation, all
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sacraments are fulfilled in the Eucharist which, according
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to the patristic teaching, is the “sacrament of sacraments”
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because it is in a very concrete sense the sacrament of the
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Kingdom. Finally, all sacraments are truly sacraments of
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Christ, i.e., are ontologically connected with his death,
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resurrection and glorification.
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[^3]: See my book *Sacraments and Orthodoxy* (New York, 1965).
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How are these categories applicable to matrimony
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which, different in this from all other sacraments, does not
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seem to be directly and immediately connected with the
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“Christ event” and which exists as a universal and natural
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institution outside the Church? The answer to this
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question is given partially at least in the liturgical celebration
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of matrimony.
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## [II.](#II) {#II}
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The present liturgy of matrimony in the Orthodox
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Church consists of two services—the Betrothal and the
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Crowning—the first service taking place normally in the
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vestibule of the church and the second, having primarily
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the form of a procession which introduces the couple into
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the Church. We may leave out of this paper the
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description of the complex development of these services and
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the various strata of symbolism with which they were
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adorned on the liturgically fertile soil of Byzantium.[^4] Let
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us rather concentrate on the fundamental significance of
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this peculiar “liturgical dualism” of matrimony.
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[^4]: See A. Raes, SJ., *Le Mariage dans les Eglises d Orient* (Chevotogne, 1958).
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There can be no doubt that the first service—the
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Betrothal—is nothing else than the Christianized form of the
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marriage as it existed always and everywhere, ie., as a
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public contract sealed before God and men by those
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entering the state of marriage. It is, in other terms, the
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Christian “blessing” or “sanction” of the marriage, its
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acceptance by the Church. It appears rather late in the
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history of the Church and at a time when for all practical
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reasons the civil society coincided with the Church and
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when the Church was given an almost exclusive control
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over family. In the early pre-Constantinian Church, the
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only requirement for the members of the Church who
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wanted to marry was the preliminary permission of the
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bishop.[^5] This means that the Church did not consider
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herself to be the performer of the marriage as such and early
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documents stress the recognition by the Church of all
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civil laws governing the marriage.[^6] But if the Church did
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not “institute” the marriage, she was given the power to
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“transform it” and such is the real meaning of
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*matrimony as sacrament*. “Lo, I make all things new”: this from the
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beginning was also applied to marriage. And, it is this
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“transformation” of the marriage that constitutes the
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content of the second service mentioned above—the Crowning
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—which begins precisely as all Christian sacraments with
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a procession. The procession signifies that the “natural”
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marriage is taken now into the dimensions of the Church
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and, this means, into the dimensions of the Kingdom. The
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earliest form of this service was the simple participation
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of the newly married in the Encharist and their partaking
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as “one flesh” of the Body and Blood of Christ.[^7] Even
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today, though it has severed its connection with the
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Eucharist, the rite of matrimony keeps the indelible mark
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of its Eucharistic origin and the common cup given to
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the couple at the end of the service points back to the
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Eucharistic chalice.[^8]
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[^5]: St. Ignatius, *Ad Polycarpum*, 5 v.
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[^6]: See for example, *Epistola ad Diognetum*, v. 6; Athenagoras, *Lecatio Pro Christianis*, chap. 33, Migne, *PG* 6, 965; Ambrose, *De Inst. Virg.*, 6, Migne, *PL*, 16, 316; John Chrysostom, *Hom 56 in Genes*, 29, *PG* 54, 488.
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[^7]: See A. N. Smirensky, “The Evolution of the Present Rite of Matrimony and Parallel Canonical Developments,” *St. Viadimir's Seminary Quarterly*, 8 (1960), 40, n. 1.
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[^8]: See A. Raes, *op. cit.*, p. 49.
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In this sacramental transformation, the marriage
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acquires new dimensions. Its content and goal now is not
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mere “happiness” but the *martyria*, the witness, to the
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Kingdom of God. It is given the power to be a service of
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Christ in the world and a special vocation within the
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Church. Above everything else it is a sacrament of the
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Kingdom, for the family is one of the basic *antitypa* of the
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Kingdom.[^9]
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[^9]: See *Sacraments and Orthodoxy*, pp. 59 ff.
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The whole patristic tradition deals with matrimony
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almost exclusively in these categories in which the marriage
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is connected with the great mystery of Christ and the
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Church.[^10] This tradition, in other terms, is interested in
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the marriage as transformed and fulfilled in Christ and
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the Church—this transformation being also the fulfillment
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of the natural marriage. It deals, so to speak, with the
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ideal marriage which has died to its natural limitations
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and has risen to a new life in which it is totally
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transparent to Christ and to His Kingdom. This marriage, it is
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obvious, is indissoluble and the very categories of
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dissolubility or indissolubility simply do not apply to it. It
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transcends them because by its very nature it is already a
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transformed and transfigured marriage. And, in a certain
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way, it is only such marriage that the Church teaches and
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reflects upon and, in a sense, only such marriage is
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recognized by her and it is only to such marriage that her
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positive evaluation of matrimony is referred. An example of
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this can be seen in the canonical regulations forbidding
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the ordination of all those whose marriage is not
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“perfect,” i.e., first and unique on both sides. The marriage,
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thus, belongs to the *theologia gloriae* as in fact a part of
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ecclesiology and eschatology. The Church rejoices, so to
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speak, in this foretaste and anticipation of the Kingdom
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of God.
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[^10]: See A. Raes, *op. cit.*, p. 8 and also S. Troitsky, *Christianskaia Philosophia Braka* (Christian Philosophy of Marriage), (Paris, 1934).
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## [III.](#III) {#III}
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There exists, however, another dimension of the
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marriage—this one rooted in the pastoral mission of the
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Church in the world. If the fundamental doctrine, or
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better to say, *theoria*, vision of the marriage, as still expressed
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in the liturgy, belongs to the early, maximalistic and
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eschatological period of the Church, this second dimension
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is the fruit and the result of the long and painful
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pilgrimage of the Church through history. It would be
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improper to describe it as a lowering of the standards and
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as compromise with all kinds of “real situations.” For it
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belongs to the very essence of the Eastern Orthodox
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tradition to keep together, in a truly antinomical way, on the
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one hand the “impossible” demands on man—demands
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that entered the world when God became man so as to
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“make man God”; and on the other hand the infinite
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compassion toward man of the One who took upon Himself
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the sins of the world. Regarding marriage, it is as if, in
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one and the same breath, the Church were proclaiming
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its Divine nature and destiny, yet also, its existential
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ambiguity—the marriage as one of the major battlefields
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between the good and the evil, between God and the
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devil, between the New Adam and the old; marriage as
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inexorably rooted in the tragedy of the original sin. The
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Church keeps the glorious vision revealed to her by
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Christ; she gives the gift to all, but she also *knows* the
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“impossibility” for man fully to accept both the vision
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and the gift. Just as in the Eucharist the Church, while
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inviting her members to communicate says: “Holy things
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are for the holy,” shows that only “One is Holy,” the
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maximalism of the Church’s revelation about marriage is
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precisely that which makes her condescending to the
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unfathomable tragedies of human existence.
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The whole point therefore is that this is not a
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“compromise” but the very antinomy of the Church’s life in this
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world. The marriage *is* indissoluble, yet it is being
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dissolved all the time by sin and ignorance, passion and
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selfishness, lack of faith and lack of love. Yes, the Church
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acknowledges the divorce, but she *does not divorce!* She
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only acknowledges that here, in this concrete situation,
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this marriage has been broken, has come to an end, and
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in her compassion she gives permission to the innocent
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party to marry again. It is sufficient, however, to study
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only once the text of the rite of the second marriage to
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realize immediately the radical difference of its whole
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“ethos.” It is indeed a penitential service, it is
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intercession, it is love, but nothing of the glory and joy of that
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which has been broken remains.[^11]
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[^11]: See Hapgood, *Orthodox Service Book*, pp. 302 ff.
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In practice, all this may be deeply misunderstood.
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During the long centuries of the Church’s organic connection
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with Christian states, she had to accept many functions
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and duties, if not contrary, at least alien, to her nature.[^12]
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This has been reflected in the liturgy and in ecclesiastical
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legislation and requires a detailed and patient study. If,
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however, one asks about the “essence” of the Orthodox
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teaching about marriage, one finds it in this apparently
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paradoxical tension—its belonging to Christ and His
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Kingdom and, therefore, its indissolubility on the one hand
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and the pastoral recognition of its human frailty and
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ambiguity on the other hand. Only within this tension a
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fruitful study of the Orthodox concept and practice of
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both marriage and divorce becomes possible.
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[^12]: See A, N. Smirensky, *op. cit.*
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# [COMMENT AND DISCUSSION](#comment) {#comment}
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The ancient Christian traditions of the East converge with
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the belief of the Catholic West in a common affirmation of the
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sacramental holiness of marriage. In the plan of redemption
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the earthly reality of marriage has been transformed in Christ
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into an image, an icon, of the union of Christ with the Church.
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Man and wife are joined in a permanent relationship to each
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other that transcends the limitations of natural compatibility as
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a witness of the fidelity of the Lord to His people. In this
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perspective divorce and remarriage are more than a failure
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of personal commitment. They are a tragedy for the Church,
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the broken pieces of a holy ideal shattered by sin and human
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weakness.
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The pastoral concern of the Church for the tragedy of
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broken marriage is to respond to human frailty with healing
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forgiveness. In the Christianity of the East, this forgiveness
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implies permission to marry again. The Church neither grants nor
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acknowledges divorce, but to the lonely and abandoned it
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sorrowfully grants the right to take another spouse. For the
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person and for the Church this is a penitential recognition of
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the harsh reality of sin and the deep need for God’s grace.
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The liturgical form of the second marriage itself expresses the
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paradox of sin and grace in the words of an antinomy that
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encapsulates the very life of the Church itself. For the Church’s
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role in the world is a constant reconciliation of opposites, the
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glory of ideals *in statu Patriae* and the reality of sin *in statu viae*.
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The theology of marriage, its liturgical expression and
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canonical discipline belong to the area of antinomy. It is
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precisely in the acceptance of the consequences of this antinomy
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in the life of the Church that there is to be found the greatest
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difference between Orthodox and Latin belief. Between
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Oriental and Latin traditions the most fundamental discrepancy
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does not lie in the interpretation of the exceptions of Matthew’s
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Gospel or even in the understanding of sacramentality in
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regard to marriage. Rather, it is to be found in diverse
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conceptions of the nature and role of the Church in the world.
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In Byzantine eclesiology the life of the Church moves
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constantly upon two different levels of reality. The dichotomy of
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the Kingdom of God revealed and present in a yet unredeemed
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and sinful world gives rise to a conflict of opposites that
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belongs to the very nature of the Church. Within this context
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there exists the parallel development of theological reflection
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upon the sacramental indissolubility of marriage and the
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canonical provisions designed to meet its failure. There is a
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theology of marriage as a reflection of the Kingdom and a
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juridical counterpart mirroring human weakness.
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Three main stages mark the historical evolution of the
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Oriental Church’s approach to marriage and divorce. In the
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primitive Church we find a basic acceptance of marriage as it
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existed in the world. The writings of St. Ignatius of Antioch
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portray a bishop living among his people and uniting them into
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one community in Christ. He knew the faithful and brought the
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blessings of the Church to them at every personal change in
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the status of their lives. It is not clear that St. Ignatius speaks
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||||||
|
of a sacramental action in the blessing of marriage, but his
|
||||||
|
words fit into an ecclesiological concept in which all
|
||||||
|
sacraments are involved in the one sacrament of the Church. The
|
||||||
|
holiness of marriage lies within the holiness of the Church, It is
|
||||||
|
the Church that transforms life and marriage. But first the
|
||||||
|
Church had to accept and bless the life that existed. She had
|
||||||
|
first to accept the worldly reality of marriage.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In the pre-Constantinian Church we find an acceptance of
|
||||||
|
marriage as it existed in Roman society, including all the
|
||||||
|
regulations and customs of marriage prevailing at that time.
|
||||||
|
At the same time the great effort to proclaim the Kingdom of
|
||||||
|
God effected a gradual transformation of society. Within the
|
||||||
|
community of the Church all things are made new. Marriage
|
||||||
|
came to have a new meaning for the baptized in relationship
|
||||||
|
to the central and allembracing reality of the Eucharist.
|
||||||
|
Marriage received the acknowledgment of the bishop as the
|
||||||
|
head of the community of the faithful. With this came the
|
||||||
|
gradual integration of matrimony into the constitutional act
|
||||||
|
of the Church, the holy Eucharist.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Then came the great and tragic confusion created by the
|
||||||
|
reconciliation between the Church and the empire. On the
|
||||||
|
one hand it was a glorious triumph for the Church. On the
|
||||||
|
other it created enormous problems for both Church and
|
||||||
|
state. An extremely complex semi-Christian society provided
|
||||||
|
an environment for a disconcerting mixture of roles. At this
|
||||||
|
time the Church had not yet developed its own specific system
|
||||||
|
of canonical legislation. It made every effort, however, to
|
||||||
|
influence the civil legislation by Christian principles. The state
|
||||||
|
sanctioned the canons of the councils as state laws, but the
|
||||||
|
Church did not sanction state law as canons. The Church’s
|
||||||
|
legislation was integrated into civil legislation, but civil
|
||||||
|
legislation was never to become a part of the Church.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Between Church and state there was a hesitant and uneasy
|
||||||
|
balance. The Church saw itself as the Body of Christ and the
|
||||||
|
temple of the Holy Spirit. Yet to the state it was mainly a
|
||||||
|
society, a corporation, a visibly structured organization. The
|
||||||
|
conversion of Constantine, real as it was, was still completely
|
||||||
|
within the pagan presuppositions of conversion. The Edict of
|
||||||
|
Milan was not a Christian document. It was a typically
|
||||||
|
syncretistic pragmatic gesture. The more Constantine became
|
||||||
|
Christian the more intolerant he became. By the end of the
|
||||||
|
century Theodosius said that everyone who was not a Christian
|
||||||
|
was a mental case and should be burned. This is far from the
|
||||||
|
freedom in which the Church rejoiced at the Edict of Milan.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Church’s teachings on marriage could not be imposed
|
||||||
|
upon the state in their entirety, because the reality of greatest
|
||||||
|
concern to the Church lies beyond the province of the state.
|
||||||
|
What occurred was a gradual effort to transform society in
|
||||||
|
general and, in so doing, bring to bear upon the law a strong
|
||||||
|
moral influence. Divorce became more and more difficult to
|
||||||
|
obtain. Women moved up the social ladder to a greater equality
|
||||||
|
with men. Fundamentally, however, the tension continued to
|
||||||
|
exist between the human reality and the Christian ideal.
|
||||||
|
Marriage was one of many great sectors of society to be
|
||||||
|
Christianized, transformed and introduced to new dimensions of
|
||||||
|
‘meaning, But this was only possible within the Church and not
|
||||||
|
within the logic of civil legislation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The third stage occurred when the Church, in the person
|
||||||
|
of bishop or priest, became the minister of marriage. In a
|
||||||
|
vacuum of leadership, the Church received the total
|
||||||
|
responsibility for the familial sector of social life. Born of this necessity
|
||||||
|
were the purely temporal dimensions of the Church's dealings
|
||||||
|
with civil and societal realities. It seems that the Church was
|
||||||
|
almost forced to take on functions that do not naturally belong
|
||||||
|
to it. Christianity assumed the role of the pagan state religions
|
||||||
|
of the old empire. The Church was given a responsibility by
|
||||||
|
the state to fulfill a civil role in society in regulating the
|
||||||
|
temporal life of man. At this stage the sacramental view of
|
||||||
|
marriage began to be translated into canonical prescriptions.
|
||||||
|
The notion of the indissolubility of marriage took on extensive
|
||||||
|
juridical implications.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Looking back upon this era, Orthodox theology makes a
|
||||||
|
distinction between the disciplinary tradition of the Church
|
||||||
|
as a whole and the various canonical traditions of the
|
||||||
|
particular churches. Reasons for divorce and remarriage changed,
|
||||||
|
were expanded or restricted by the different national churches
|
||||||
|
at various times in history. But the Church itself always looked
|
||||||
|
upon divorce with the greatest reluctance. It always sought
|
||||||
|
to distinguish a temporal responsibility on the level of social
|
||||||
|
relationships from its essential role in integrating man into
|
||||||
|
the Kingdom. The Church felt no basic need to exercise judicial
|
||||||
|
authority in the temporal order. Its primary task was to refer
|
||||||
|
temporal life to the order of revelation and sacramentality.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Today the Church no longer controls the destinies of civil
|
||||||
|
socicty. It no longer exercises a purely social jurisdiction. But in
|
||||||
|
the present stage of transition, it still acts as if it must cling
|
||||||
|
to that power and responsibility. The Church still feels the
|
||||||
|
weight of an ancient responsibility for all temporal
|
||||||
|
arrangements. Within the ambiguities of this situation, Orthodox
|
||||||
|
practice now wavers between the Byzantine or Russian
|
||||||
|
imperial legislation on what constitutes grounds for divorce and
|
||||||
|
the legal rules of the states and nations in which she lives.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The ambiguity of the Church’s stance between a theology
|
||||||
|
that stresses the indissolubility of marriage and the canonical
|
||||||
|
practice that allows dissolubility is not to be understood as a
|
||||||
|
compromise with the world. It is precisely the lot of the Church
|
||||||
|
in the world. Sin is not a juridical crime. It is a rebellion against
|
||||||
|
God. The Church confronts the reality of sin both *in statu Patriae*,
|
||||||
|
from which stems her teachings and eschatological
|
||||||
|
orientation, and *in statu viae*, from which comes her pastoral
|
||||||
|
concern for man.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Within Orthodox tradition there is no such thing as divorce.
|
||||||
|
The Church can no more remove the sacramentality of a
|
||||||
|
marriage than she can remove the consecration from the
|
||||||
|
Eucharistic Host. The Church simply grants the right to
|
||||||
|
remarry in certain cases. What about the previous marriage? The
|
||||||
|
ontological status of that first marriage is simply never made
|
||||||
|
a matter of question. To ask the question supposes a static
|
||||||
|
view of reality. Within the dynamic action attributed to the
|
||||||
|
Holy Spirit by Orthodox theology, marriage can exist only
|
||||||
|
while people actually live a marriage. If the marriage is not
|
||||||
|
lived, it is dead. It is nothing. The real problem is not the
|
||||||
|
abstract, Aristotelian essence that might remain, but what is to be
|
||||||
|
done in pastoral terms with the existing situation. This is where
|
||||||
|
the mechanics of canonical procedure in allowing remarriage
|
||||||
|
are rooted.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The basic question today is not how to delineate various
|
||||||
|
new juridical reasons to allow divorce and remarriage. It is
|
||||||
|
rather the question of what constitutes the sacramentality of
|
||||||
|
marriage and how close does this sacramentality constitute
|
||||||
|
a reality that can be expressed in juridical terms. What is the
|
||||||
|
relationship between what can be described as the maximum
|
||||||
|
of the Church’s teaching, which is not only an ideal, but the
|
||||||
|
revelation of the true ontology of marriage and the real
|
||||||
|
situation of man?
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Is the dialectic between indissolubility and dissolubility just
|
||||||
|
a matter of toleration or rather a category of tension which has
|
||||||
|
to be kept if the Church is to fulfill her mission among men?
|
||||||
|
Unless we ask the most basic questions about the nature of
|
||||||
|
marriage and its relationship to the mission of the Church, the
|
||||||
|
very sensitive question of divorce and remarriage will not be
|
||||||
|
solved. The whole complicated development of the Church’s
|
||||||
|
teaching on marriage is one expression of her fundamental
|
||||||
|
relationship to the world. It is only from a study of this relationship
|
||||||
|
in which the problem is truly rooted that a solution can be
|
||||||
|
found.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In Orthodox tradition sacrament or “mysterion” implies
|
||||||
|
necessarily the idea of a transformation, a passage from the
|
||||||
|
old into a new dimension of both meaning and reality. The
|
||||||
|
Church’s salvific mission to the world is fulfilled in a presence
|
||||||
|
to the world in as far as the world can be transformed and has
|
||||||
|
to be transformed by it. The world is not something wholly
|
||||||
|
separated from the Church. It is the very matter of the
|
||||||
|
Kingdom. In this sense, marriage is transformed by the Church and
|
||||||
|
in the Church, while divorce remains a part of the morality
|
||||||
|
of the world. It is a morality that the Church cannot be
|
||||||
|
indifferent to or spurn. She must not only be interested in the
|
||||||
|
morality of the world but must also transform it to a new
|
||||||
|
reality.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Dr. Noonan's paper concluded quite convincingly that some
|
||||||
|
Christians considered marriage dissoluble at a particular time
|
||||||
|
in history. He did not go beyond this premise to generalize
|
||||||
|
upon this practice of the Church as being decisive for a later
|
||||||
|
period. “It has been done for two hundred years in the past.
|
||||||
|
Therefore, it can be done today” was not his conclusion. This
|
||||||
|
type of argumentation would run counter to the reality of
|
||||||
|
growth inherent in the nature of man and religion. It would be
|
||||||
|
a type of legal positivism foreign to Christianity.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Morality develops into a greater refinement of norms and
|
||||||
|
a greater perceptiveness of judgment from reflection upon the
|
||||||
|
existing situation of man in the light of primary principles. At
|
||||||
|
one time slavery was accepted by Scripture, by tradition and
|
||||||
|
by the Church. But today no one can consider slavery morally
|
||||||
|
acceptable or even indifferent. The argument that it was
|
||||||
|
accepted at one time does not prove that it can be accepted
|
||||||
|
again. The Church moves with history and adjusts itself to
|
||||||
|
developing human reality. As with the eventual rejection of
|
||||||
|
slavery, so in the understanding of marriage there may be an
|
||||||
|
evolution from an acceptance of dissolubility to belief in its
|
||||||
|
absolute indissolubility. The ultimate criterion will not be the
|
||||||
|
practice of the past, but the meaning of Christian marriage
|
||||||
|
in the light of the real human situation today.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
On the other hand, the argument from the *praxis ecclesiae*
|
||||||
|
does have a negative value. Development cannot imply
|
||||||
|
contradiction. The Church is based upon a revelation and an
|
||||||
|
institution in which tradition is implied. The *quod traditur* is an
|
||||||
|
essential element in a revealed religion. To be Christian means
|
||||||
|
to be traditional because tradition belongs to the
|
||||||
|
revealed religion. So there exists the antinomy of developing
|
||||||
|
human nature that precludes a happening of one time from
|
||||||
|
being normative for all time and the need to study history to
|
||||||
|
find the negative limit beyond which contradiction excludes
|
||||||
|
continuity. The problem of tradition is closely connected with
|
||||||
|
the meaning of the theology of real development in doctrine.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
We cannot say that at one time the Church believed one
|
||||||
|
thing and at a later time she believed another in contradiction
|
||||||
|
to it. The Church, in fact, in the early period was largely
|
||||||
|
unconcerned with the institutional expressions of society.
|
||||||
|
However, from the very beginning she had a notion of man, a
|
||||||
|
notion of society and a notion of the destiny of man, which
|
||||||
|
ultimately excluded the possibility of man’s being enslaved.
|
||||||
|
Again, the Church had from the beginning, in the New
|
||||||
|
Testament and in the Fathers, an intuition, an understanding, a
|
||||||
|
vision of marriage as indissoluble. Yet this vision could not be
|
||||||
|
made an immediate practical possibility because of the
|
||||||
|
extremely adverse social conditions of the time. The teaching had
|
||||||
|
to develop gradually. It was only at the time of the Emperor
|
||||||
|
Leo VI in the tenth century that matrimony as a liturgical
|
||||||
|
service was made obligatory for all Christians of the empire.
|
||||||
|
This became the pastoral and missionary means of the Church
|
||||||
|
to reach the people. Legislation prior to this time was mainly
|
||||||
|
concerned with problems of regulating marriage and divorce.
|
||||||
|
Now it became a question of how to impose upon the people
|
||||||
|
the Christian view of marriage. The liturgical form developed
|
||||||
|
as a teaching of what marriage should be. Christian history
|
||||||
|
shows the explicitation, not the change, of a particular truth.
|
||||||
|
There is a slow and patient evolution within society that brings
|
||||||
|
about a real development.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
When we study the past, we study it not only in the effort
|
||||||
|
to see how many metamorphoses took place, but how certain
|
||||||
|
basic ideas—God, man, history, world, nature—developed and
|
||||||
|
were refined. It would be a catastrophe if today we suddenly
|
||||||
|
proclaimed, as a kind of ecumenical achievement, that whereas
|
||||||
|
in the past we had thought of marriage as indissoluble, today
|
||||||
|
we all agree that it is dissoluble. On the other hand, to simply
|
||||||
|
maintain the old tradition of absolute indissolubility would be
|
||||||
|
equally intolerable. We are moving today, not in the direction
|
||||||
|
of a liberation of marriage from medieval conceptualizations,
|
||||||
|
but rather toward a deepening awareness of what has always
|
||||||
|
been central in the belief of the Church, regardless of the
|
||||||
|
inadequacy of the juridical or philosophical categories in which
|
||||||
|
it has been expressed. For almost two thousand years, the
|
||||||
|
Church has proclaimed that marriage is sacred and
|
||||||
|
indissoluble. Yet all the while she has reluctantly accepted its
|
||||||
|
dissolution to some extent as a tragic human failure.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
There will always be a clash between the Kingdom and the
|
||||||
|
world, the ideal and the exception, the eschatological hope
|
||||||
|
and the reality. This dialectic between lofty goal and the
|
||||||
|
reluctant acceptance of failure must maintain a proper balance
|
||||||
|
in order that a real development may occur. Where the
|
||||||
|
dialectic is ignored or overemphasis is given only one side, ultimately
|
||||||
|
the impasse results in stagnation. Both sides of the dialectic
|
||||||
|
have a role. St. Paul said that in the Kingdom “there is neither
|
||||||
|
male nor female,” yet he treated women in the same category
|
||||||
|
as children and slaves. The role of women in the Church
|
||||||
|
suffered in the imbalance of the latter perspective. It is only
|
||||||
|
when we explore more fully the reasons why St. Paul
|
||||||
|
enunciated the fundamental equality that a restoration of balance
|
||||||
|
can be achieved. In similar fashion, between ideal and
|
||||||
|
exception the imbalance resulting from an overemphasis upon
|
||||||
|
the ideal will be corrected by exploring the implications of the
|
||||||
|
human reality that makes exception possible.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
In the theology of marriage of the Eastern traditions the
|
||||||
|
primary point of departure is not the natural properties of
|
||||||
|
marriage, but the supernatural union that it images. In the
|
||||||
|
liturgy of matrimony the last act of the rite is the coronation:
|
||||||
|
“Now receive these crowns in God’s Kingdom.” In its ultimate
|
||||||
|
reality marriage is not measured by its current cultural
|
||||||
|
acceptance. It is an icon of the Kingdom. Marriage transcends
|
||||||
|
happiness. It transcends contract and even the family. But
|
||||||
|
having defined marriage in these supernatural terms,
|
||||||
|
Orthodoxy still remembers the natural dimension of marriage. The
|
||||||
|
tension between the two exists and is inescapable. It is
|
||||||
|
important, however, that the starting point of understanding
|
||||||
|
begin, and not end, with revelation. The modern reduction of
|
||||||
|
marriage to happiness and sexual fulfillment to which the
|
||||||
|
Church may add a transcendent demand is not adequate. For
|
||||||
|
Christians marriage is primarily a union witnessing the union
|
||||||
|
of Christ and the Church.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
At the time of the revival of the study of Roman Law which
|
||||||
|
inspired the science of canon law in the Western Church, a
|
||||||
|
juridical conceptualization overtook the personal and
|
||||||
|
theological vision of marriage. The canonical conception came to center
|
||||||
|
upon consent and copula, instead of divine mystery and human
|
||||||
|
relationships. With this came a canonical refinement of the
|
||||||
|
conditions for the validity of the marital contract. Rather than
|
||||||
|
the *consortium totius vitae* of an earlier humanism or the
|
||||||
|
“mysterion” of the Fathers, marriage came to be equated with
|
||||||
|
contractual obligations and rights. A whole machinery was
|
||||||
|
set up in the Latin Church to adjudicate the validity of
|
||||||
|
marriages according to the canonical definition of a unique
|
||||||
|
contract giving the right to bodily acts of reproduction. In an
|
||||||
|
effort to achieve legal clarity, both the personal elements of
|
||||||
|
this unique relationship and the supernatural context of
|
||||||
|
mystery were pushed to the background. Consequently, where we
|
||||||
|
in the Church should be speaking of the common life of two
|
||||||
|
spouses who are children of God, we are probing in tribunal
|
||||||
|
practice the conditions of a contract for bodily acts. The result
|
||||||
|
is a sterility of vision that has reduced the great mystery of
|
||||||
|
human and divine love to an unreal formulation of legal rules.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The Church’s primary task in marriage today is to proclaim
|
||||||
|
the full richness of both divine revelation and human
|
||||||
|
understanding. It is not to inform the world that the Church now
|
||||||
|
accepts new rules for allowing divorce and remarriage. We
|
||||||
|
must become less interested in the judicial forum, and more
|
||||||
|
concerned about a catechesis of marriage. In fact, all that we
|
||||||
|
say about the indissolubility or dissolubility of marriage implies
|
||||||
|
a grasp of the preliminary question, what is marriage. It is
|
||||||
|
toward an understanding of this sacred mystery that we must
|
||||||
|
now strive together from all the traditions of the Christian
|
||||||
|
experience.
|
||||||
|
|
|
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Additionally, we acknowledge a single hypostasis of the incarnate Word, and we b
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[^5]: Rom. 10:3
|
[^5]: Rom. 10:3
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[^6]: The word "blasphemy" is used repeatedly by Gregory to describe Beccus' doctrine concerning the procession of the Spirit. To be sure, the deeply biblical nuance of the word in Scripture and in patristic literature did not escape him. In the New' testament, the word indicates violation of the power and majesty of God (Mark 2:7; Luke 5:2 1). In the early patristic period, opposing theological views were stigmatized as blasphemy. See especially G. Kittel (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, I (Grand Rapids-London, 1964), 621-25.
|
[^6]: The word "blasphemy" is used repeatedly by Gregory to describe Beccus' doctrine concerning the procession of the Spirit. To be sure, the deeply biblical nuance of the word in Scripture and in patristic literature did not escape him. In the New Testament, the word indicates violation of the power and majesty of God (Mark 2:7; Luke 5:2 1). In the early patristic period, opposing theological views were stigmatized as blasphemy. See especially G. Kittel (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, I (Grand Rapids-London, 1964), 621-25.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[^7]: Psalm 73:27
|
[^7]: Psalm 73:27
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@ -63,14 +63,17 @@ And Beccus was asked by the emperor and by the holy synod to state the reasons f
|
||||||
[^18]: Luke 9:62
|
[^18]: Luke 9:62
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
1. To John Beccus and to those who follow him, to Constantine Meliteniotes and George Metochites, who were born of us,[^19] and who were reared in our customs and doctrines, but who did not abide in them despite the fact that these were their own and of the Fathers, and had been established with the passage of time ever since the Christian faith began to be preached in these parts. But these, against which not even the gates of hell have prevailed nor shall prevail[^20] — they have despised, and I do not know why they condemn them, or why they refuse to praise them. But then they introduced instead a belief that was entirely unknown to its authors, for they respect neither the text's antiquity nor those who revealed these truths, namely, the ones who spoke of the things of the Spirit not for any other reason but because they were filled with the Spirit. To these men because they were so corrupt that they held beliefs both strange and alien to our traditions to the detriment and destruction of the Church; and, sometime later, they renounced this madness and declared by word and in writing before countless eyes and ears that they would be accursed if, in the future, they should not be found in full possession of the traditional faith, but drawn to a belief alien to the Church; and because they did not abide by their own written statement concerning this repentance, but changed their mind and opinion and again turned to their previous apostasy, as if possessed of a rebellious nature and a faithlessness toward ancestral doctrines, to these, because they wickedly turned away and preferred this separation from their own Church, we pronounce the resolution which they have pronounced upon themselves (or in the case of those who, in the future, will dare to do so), we cut them off (since they hold such views) from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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1. To John Beccus and to those who follow him, to Constantine Meliteniotes and George Metochites, who were born of us,[^19] and who were reared in our customs and doctrines, but who did not abide in them despite the fact that these were their own and of the Fathers, and had been established with the passage of time ever since the Christian faith began to be preached in these parts. But these, against which not even the gates of hell have prevailed nor shall prevail[^20] — they have despised, and I do not know why they condemn them, or why they refuse to praise them. But then they introduced instead a belief that was entirely unknown to its authors, for they respect neither the text's antiquity nor those who revealed these truths, namely, the ones who spoke of the things of the Spirit not for any other reason but because they were filled with the Spirit. To these men because they were so corrupt that they held beliefs both strange and alien to our traditions to the detriment and destruction of the Church; and, sometime later, they renounced this madness and declared by word and in writing before countless eyes and ears that they would be accursed if, in the future, they should not be found in full possession of the traditional faith, but drawn to a belief alien to the Church; and because they did not abide by their own written statement concerning this repentance, but changed their mind and opinion and again turned to their previous apostasy, as if possessed of a rebellious nature and a faithlessness toward ancestral doctrines, to these, because they wickedly turned away and preferred this separation from their own Church, we pronounce the resolution which they have pronounced upon themselves (or in the case of those who, in the future, will dare to do so), we cut them off (since they hold such views) from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a1}
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[^19]: Cf. 1 John 2:19
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[^19]: Cf. 1 John 2:19
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[^20]: Matt. 16:18
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[^20]: Matt. 16:18
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2. To the same [John Beccus], and to those who along with him were rash enough to introduce into the apostolic faith matters which the teachers of the Church did not hand down and which we have not received through them, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cur them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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2. To the same [John Beccus], and to those who along with him were rash enough to introduce into the apostolic faith matters which the teachers of the Church did not hand down and which we have not received through them, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a2}
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3. To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son; thus according to them the Son is united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit's existence. This, they say, is supported by the phrase of Saint John of Damascus, "the Father is the projector through the Son of the manifesting Spirit."[^21] This, however, can never mean what they say, inasmuch as it clearly denotes the manifestation — through the intermediary of the Son — of the Spirit, whose existence is from the Father. For the same John of Damascus would not have said — in the exact same chapter — that the only cause in the Trinity is God the Father, thus denying, by the use of the word "only," the causative principle to the remaining two hypostases.[^22] Nor would he have, again, said elsewhere, "and we speak, likewise, of the Holy Spirit as the 'Spirit of the Son,' yet we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son."[^23] For both of these views to be true is impossible. To those who have not accepted the interpretation given to these testimonia by the Fathers, but, on the contrary, perceive them in a manner altogether forbidden by them, we pronounce the above recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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3. To the same, who say that the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit, and who cannot conceive the Father as the cause of the hypostasis of the Spirit — giving it existence and being — except through the Son; thus according to them the Son is united to the Father as joint-cause and contributor to the Spirit's existence. This, they say, is supported by the phrase of Saint John of Damascus, "the Father is the projector through the Son of the manifesting Spirit."[^21] This, however, can never mean what they say, inasmuch as it clearly denotes the manifestation — through the intermediary of the Son — of the Spirit, whose existence is from the Father. For the same John of Damascus would not have said — in the exact same chapter — that the only cause in the Trinity is God the Father, thus denying, by the use of the word "only," the causative principle to the remaining two hypostases.[^22] Nor would he have, again, said elsewhere, "and we speak, likewise, of the Holy Spirit as the 'Spirit of the Son,' yet we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son."[^23] For both of these views to be true is impossible. To those who have not accepted the interpretation given to these testimonia by the Fathers, but, on the contrary, perceive them in a manner altogether forbidden by them, we pronounce the above recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a3}
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[^21]: John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos II, 36 (= PG 94.849B): "He Himself [the Father], then, is mind, the depth of reason, begetter of the Word, and, through the Word, projector of the manifesting Spirit."
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[^21]: John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos II, 36 (= PG 94.849B): "He Himself [the Father], then, is mind, the depth of reason, begetter of the Word, and, through the Word, projector of the manifesting Spirit."
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@ -78,13 +81,16 @@ And Beccus was asked by the emperor and by the holy synod to state the reasons f
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[^23]: Ibid., 30 (= PG 94-832B).
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[^23]: Ibid., 30 (= PG 94-832B).
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4. To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Frather, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who again propose as proof the phrase "the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son." In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit's shining forth and manifestation. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines form and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun's rays; it further denotes the bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him. For this would mean that the Spirit has the Son as cause and source (exactly as it has the Father), not to say that it has its cause and source more so from the Son than from the Father; for it is said that that from which existence is derived likewise is believed to enrich the source and to be the cause of being. To those who believe and say such things, we pronounce the above resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
|
4. To the same, who affirm that the Paraclete, which is from the Father, has its existence through the Son and from the Son, and who again propose as proof the phrase "the Spirit exists through the Son and from the Son." In certain texts [of the Fathers], the phrase denotes the Spirit's shining forth and manifestation. Indeed, the very Paraclete shines form and is manifest eternally through the Son, in the same way that light shines forth and is manifest through the intermediary of the sun's rays; it further denotes the bestowing, giving, and sending of the Spirit to us. It does not, however, mean that it subsists through the Son and from the Son, and that it receives its being through Him and from Him. For this would mean that the Spirit has the Son as cause and source (exactly as it has the Father), not to say that it has its cause and source more so from the Son than from the Father; for it is said that that from which existence is derived likewise is believed to enrich the source and to be the cause of being. To those who believe and say such things, we pronounce the above resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a4}
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5. To the same, who say that the preposition "through" everywhere in theology is identical to the preposition "from" and, as a result, maintain that there is no difference in saying that the Spirit proceeds "through the Son" from saying that it proceeds "from the Son" — whence, undoubtedly, the origin of their idea that the existence and essence of the Spirit is from the Son. And they either infer a double or a single procession of origin, and join the Son to the Father according to this explanation of "cause," both of which are beyond all blasphemy. For there is no other hypostasis in the Trinity except the Father's, from which the existence and essence of the consubstantial [Son and Holy Spirit] is derived. According to the common mind of the Church and the aforementioned saints, the Father is the foundation and the source of the Son and the Spirit, the only source of divinity, and the only cause. If, in fact, it is also said by some of the saints that the Spirit proceeds "through the Son," what is meant here is the eternal manifestation of the Spirit by the Son, not the purely [personal] emanation into being of the Spirit, which has its existence from the Father. Otherwise, this would deprive the Father from being the only cause and the only source of divinity, and would expose the theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus] who says "everything the Father is said to possess, the Son, likewise, possesses except causality"[^24] as a dishonest theologian. To these who speak thus, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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5. To the same, who say that the preposition "through" everywhere in theology is identical to the preposition "from" and, as a result, maintain that there is no difference in saying that the Spirit proceeds "through the Son" from saying that it proceeds "from the Son" — whence, undoubtedly, the origin of their idea that the existence and essence of the Spirit is from the Son. And they either infer a double or a single procession of origin, and join the Son to the Father according to this explanation of "cause," both of which are beyond all blasphemy. For there is no other hypostasis in the Trinity except the Father's, from which the existence and essence of the consubstantial [Son and Holy Spirit] is derived. According to the common mind of the Church and the aforementioned saints, the Father is the foundation and the source of the Son and the Spirit, the only source of divinity, and the only cause. If, in fact, it is also said by some of the saints that the Spirit proceeds "through the Son," what is meant here is the eternal manifestation of the Spirit by the Son, not the purely [personal] emanation into being of the Spirit, which has its existence from the Father. Otherwise, this would deprive the Father from being the only cause and the only source of divinity, and would expose the theologian [Gregory of Nazianzus] who says "everything the Father is said to possess, the Son, likewise, possesses except causality"[^24] as a dishonest theologian. To these who speak thus, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a5}
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[^24]: Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 34, PG 36.252A; cf. also Mouzalon's use and explanation of this proof-text, in PG 142.293A-B.
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[^24]: Gregory of Nazianzus, Oratio 34, PG 36.252A; cf. also Mouzalon's use and explanation of this proof-text, in PG 142.293A-B.
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6. To the same, who contend that the unique essence and divinity of the Father and the Son is the cause of the Spirit's existence — an idea which no one who has ever had it in his mind has either expressed or considered making public. For the common essence and nature is not the cause of the hypostasis; nor does this common essence ever generate or project that which is undivided; on the other hand, the essence which is accompanied by individual characteristics does, and this, according to the great Maximus, denotes the hypostasis.[^25] But also, according to the great Basil, because he too defines the hypostasis as that which describes and brings to mind what in each thing is common, and which cannot be described by means of individual characteristics which appear in it.[^26] Because of this, the indivisible essence always projects something indivisible (or generates the indivisible that generates), in order that the created may be [simultaneously] the projector as well as the projected; the essence of the Father and the Son, however, is one, and is not, on the whole, indivisible.[^27] To these, who absurdly blaspheme thus, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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6. To the same, who contend that the unique essence and divinity of the Father and the Son is the cause of the Spirit's existence — an idea which no one who has ever had it in his mind has either expressed or considered making public. For the common essence and nature is not the cause of the hypostasis; nor does this common essence ever generate or project that which is undivided; on the other hand, the essence which is accompanied by individual characteristics does, and this, according to the great Maximus, denotes the hypostasis.[^25] But also, according to the great Basil, because he too defines the hypostasis as that which describes and brings to mind what in each thing is common, and which cannot be described by means of individual characteristics which appear in it.[^26] Because of this, the indivisible essence always projects something indivisible (or generates the indivisible that generates), in order that the created may be [simultaneously] the projector as well as the projected; the essence of the Father and the Son, however, is one, and is not, on the whole, indivisible.[^27] To these, who absurdly blaspheme thus, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a6}
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[^25]: Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Letter 7: To John the Presbyter, PG 91.436A.
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[^25]: Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Letter 7: To John the Presbyter, PG 91.436A.
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@ -93,20 +99,25 @@ And Beccus was asked by the emperor and by the holy synod to state the reasons f
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[^27]: On this section, cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, II, 27 (= PG 94.825A-B).
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[^27]: On this section, cf. John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa, in Kotter, Die Schriften des Johannes von Damaskos, II, 27 (= PG 94.825A-B).
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7. To the same, who teach that the Father and the Son — not as two principles and two causes — share in the causality of the Spirit, and that the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition "through." According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit's cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son. This being so, they introduce a plurality and a multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit, even though this was prohibited on countless occasions. As such, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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7. To the same, who teach that the Father and the Son — not as two principles and two causes — share in the causality of the Spirit, and that the Son is as much a participant with the Father as is implied in the preposition "through." According to the distinction and strength of these prepositions, they introduce a distinction in the Spirit's cause, with the result that sometimes they believe and say that the Father is cause, and sometimes the Son. This being so, they introduce a plurality and a multitude of causes in the procession of the Spirit, even though this was prohibited on countless occasions. As such, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a7}
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8. To the same, who stoutly maintain that the Father by virtue of the nature — not by virtue of the hypostasis — is the Holy Spirit's cause; the result is that they necessarily proclaim the Son as cause of the Spirit, since the Son has the same nature as the Father. At the same time, they fail to see the absurdity that results from this. For it is necessary first that the Spirit be the cause of someone, for the simple reason that it has the same nature as the Father. Secondly, the number of the cause increases, since as many hypostases as share in nature must, likewise, share in causality. Thirdly, the common essence and nature is transformed into the cause of the hypostasis, which all logic — and, along with this, nature itself — prohibits. To these, who believe in such things strange and alien to truth, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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8. To the same, who stoutly maintain that the Father by virtue of the nature — not by virtue of the hypostasis — is the Holy Spirit's cause; the result is that they necessarily proclaim the Son as cause of the Spirit, since the Son has the same nature as the Father. At the same time, they fail to see the absurdity that results from this. For it is necessary first that the Spirit be the cause of someone, for the simple reason that it has the same nature as the Father. Secondly, the number of the cause increases, since as many hypostases as share in nature must, likewise, share in causality. Thirdly, the common essence and nature is transformed into the cause of the hypostasis, which all logic — and, along with this, nature itself — prohibits. To these, who believe in such things strange and alien to truth, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a8}
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9. To the same, who state that, in reference to the creation of the world, the phrase "through the Son" denotes the immediate cause,[^28] as well as the fact that it denies the Son the right to be creator and cause of things made "through Him." That is to say, in theology proper [the study of the Trinity in itself], even if the Father is called the initial cause of the Son and the Spirit, He is also, "through the Son," the cause of the Spirit. Accordingly, the Son cannot be separated from the Father in the procession of the Spirit. By saying such things, they irrationally join the Son to the Father in the causation of the Spirit. In reality, even if the Son, like the Father, is creator of all things made "through Him," it does not follow that He is also the Spirit's cause, because the Father is the projector of the Spirit through Him; nor, again, does it follow that, because the Father is the Spirit's projector "through the Son," He is, through Him, the cause of the Spirit. For the formula "through the Son" here denotes the manifestation and illumination [of the Spirit by the Son], and not the emanation of the Spirit into being. If this was not so, it would be difficult, indeed, even to enumerate the theological absurdities that follow. To these, who irrationally express such views, and ascribe them to the writings of the saints, and from these stir up a multitude of blasphemies, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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9. To the same, who state that, in reference to the creation of the world, the phrase "through the Son" denotes the immediate cause,[^28] as well as the fact that it denies the Son the right to be creator and cause of things made "through Him." That is to say, in theology proper [the study of the Trinity in itself], even if the Father is called the initial cause of the Son and the Spirit, He is also, "through the Son," the cause of the Spirit. Accordingly, the Son cannot be separated from the Father in the procession of the Spirit. By saying such things, they irrationally join the Son to the Father in the causation of the Spirit. In reality, even if the Son, like the Father, is creator of all things made "through Him," it does not follow that He is also the Spirit's cause, because the Father is the projector of the Spirit through Him; nor, again, does it follow that, because the Father is the Spirit's projector "through the Son," He is, through Him, the cause of the Spirit. For the formula "through the Son" here denotes the manifestation and illumination [of the Spirit by the Son], and not the emanation of the Spirit into being. If this was not so, it would be difficult, indeed, even to enumerate the theological absurdities that follow. To these, who irrationally express such views, and ascribe them to the writings of the saints, and from these stir up a multitude of blasphemies, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a9}
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[^28]: Immediate or primordial cause: προκαταρκτικὴ αἰτία; cf. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, PG 32.136B.
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[^28]: Immediate or primordial cause: προκαταρκτικὴ αἰτία; cf. Basil, On the Holy Spirit, PG 32.136B.
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10. To the same, who declare that the Son is said to be the fountain of life in the same way that the Virgin Mother of God is said to be the fountain of life.[^29] The Virgin is so called because she lent living flesh to the only-begotten Word with a rational and intellectual soul, and became the cause of mankind born according to Christ. Similarly, those who understand life to be in the Holy Spirit will think of the Son as the fountain of life in terms of cause. Hence, their argument — from conclusions drawn of incongruous comparisons and examples — for the participation of the Son with the Father in the procession of the Spirit. And yet, it is not because the Virgin is said to be the fountain of life that the only-begotten Word of God is called the fountain of life. For she is so called because it is from her that real life came, for the same Word of God and true God was born according to His humanity, and she became the cause of His holy flesh. As for the Son, He is the fountain of life because He became the cause of life for us who were dead to sin; because he became as an overflowing river to everyone; and because, for those who believe in the Son, the Spirit is bestowed as from this fountain and through Him. This grace of the Spirit is poured forth, and it is neither novel nor alien to Scripture were it to be called by the same name as Holy Spirit. For, sometimes, an act (ἐνέργεια) is identified by the name of the one who acts, since frequently we do not refuse to call "sun" the sun's own luster and light.[^30] To these, whose ambition is to draw such conclusions, and to reconcile what by nature cannot at all be reconciled, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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10. To the same, who declare that the Son is said to be the fountain of life in the same way that the Virgin Mother of God is said to be the fountain of life.[^29] The Virgin is so called because she lent living flesh to the only-begotten Word with a rational and intellectual soul, and became the cause of mankind born according to Christ. Similarly, those who understand life to be in the Holy Spirit will think of the Son as the fountain of life in terms of cause. Hence, their argument — from conclusions drawn of incongruous comparisons and examples — for the participation of the Son with the Father in the procession of the Spirit. And yet, it is not because the Virgin is said to be the fountain of life that the only-begotten Word of God is called the fountain of life. For she is so called because it is from her that real life came, for the same Word of God and true God was born according to His humanity, and she became the cause of His holy flesh. As for the Son, He is the fountain of life because He became the cause of life for us who were dead to sin; because he became as an overflowing river to everyone; and because, for those who believe in the Son, the Spirit is bestowed as from this fountain and through Him. This grace of the Spirit is poured forth, and it is neither novel nor alien to Scripture were it to be called by the same name as Holy Spirit. For, sometimes, an act (ἐνέργεια) is identified by the name of the one who acts, since frequently we do not refuse to call "sun" the sun's own luster and light.[^30] To these, whose ambition is to draw such conclusions, and to reconcile what by nature cannot at all be reconciled, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a10}
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[^29]: For the use of the phrase in patristic literature, sec G. W H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1961-1968), fasc. 4, 1080.
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[^29]: For the use of the phrase in patristic literature, sec G. W H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (Oxford, 1961-1968), fasc. 4, 1080.
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[^30]: Cf. Patriarch Philotheus' words in Against Gregoras, PG 151.916D: "And this divine splendor and grace, this energy and gift of the all-Holy Spirit, is called Holy Spirit by Scripture ... for we call 'sun' not only the solar disk, but the splendor and energy sent forth from there."
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[^30]: Cf. Patriarch Philotheus' words in Against Gregoras, PG 151.916D: "And this divine splendor and grace, this energy and gift of the all-Holy Spirit, is called Holy Spirit by Scripture ... for we call 'sun' not only the solar disk, but the splendor and energy sent forth from there."
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11. To the same, who do not receive the writings of the saints in the correct manner intended by the Church, nor do they honor what appears to be the closest [interpretation] according to the patristic traditions and the common beliefs about God and things divine, but distort the meaning of these writings so as to set them at variance with the prescribed dogmas, or adhere to the mere word and, from this, bring forth strange doctrine, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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11. To the same, who do not receive the writings of the saints in the correct manner intended by the Church, nor do they honor what appears to be the closest [interpretation] according to the patristic traditions and the common beliefs about God and things divine, but distort the meaning of these writings so as to set them at variance with the prescribed dogmas, or adhere to the mere word and, from this, bring forth strange doctrine, we pronounce the above-recorded resolution and judgment, we cut them off from the membership of the Orthodox, and we banish them from the flock of the Church of God.
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{#a11}
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Certainly, the doctrines of the above-listed and already expelled individuals are filled with blasphemy, malice, and fall short of all ecclesiastical prudence. Even if Beccus, the father of these doctrines — or someone among his zealous supporters — confidently affirms that these teachings are the thoughts of the saints, in reality, we must suppose him a slanderer and blasphemer of the saints. For where have the God-bearing Fathers said that God the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit? Where do they say that the Paraclete has its existence from the Son and through the Son? Again, where do they say that the same Paraclete has its existence from the Father and from the Son? In what text do they teach that the one essence and divinity of the Father and the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit's existence? Who, and in which of his works, ever prohibited anyone from saying that the hypostasis of the Father is the unique cause of being of the Son and the Spirit? Who among those who believe that the Father is the cause of the Spirit has taught that this is by virtue of the nature, not by virtue of the hypostasis? And who has failed to maintain this as the characteristic that distinguishes the Father from the other two hypostases? Finally, who says that those other teachings, about which he has lied by insulting the Fathers, belong to the Fathers? He abstains from neither evil. For at some places he alters their own words, and, even when he uses the words without distortion, he does not adhere to their true meaning. Neither does he look at the aim that the author had in mind, but arrogantly passes over the purpose and the desire, and even the express intent of the author's statement, and adheres to the word and, having obtained the shadow instead of the body, composes books. And this is like saying that he twists ropes of sand and builds houses therefrom to make I do not know what, unless it is a monument and a memorial — the former, an advertisement of his folly the latter, a declaration of the struggle he undertook against his own salvation. This being so, we condemn the doctrines themselves together with their authors, and judge that their memory, like the expelled, be eliminated from the Church with a resounding noise.
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Certainly, the doctrines of the above-listed and already expelled individuals are filled with blasphemy, malice, and fall short of all ecclesiastical prudence. Even if Beccus, the father of these doctrines — or someone among his zealous supporters — confidently affirms that these teachings are the thoughts of the saints, in reality, we must suppose him a slanderer and blasphemer of the saints. For where have the God-bearing Fathers said that God the Father is, through the Son, the cause of the Spirit? Where do they say that the Paraclete has its existence from the Son and through the Son? Again, where do they say that the same Paraclete has its existence from the Father and from the Son? In what text do they teach that the one essence and divinity of the Father and the Son is the cause of the Holy Spirit's existence? Who, and in which of his works, ever prohibited anyone from saying that the hypostasis of the Father is the unique cause of being of the Son and the Spirit? Who among those who believe that the Father is the cause of the Spirit has taught that this is by virtue of the nature, not by virtue of the hypostasis? And who has failed to maintain this as the characteristic that distinguishes the Father from the other two hypostases? Finally, who says that those other teachings, about which he has lied by insulting the Fathers, belong to the Fathers? He abstains from neither evil. For at some places he alters their own words, and, even when he uses the words without distortion, he does not adhere to their true meaning. Neither does he look at the aim that the author had in mind, but arrogantly passes over the purpose and the desire, and even the express intent of the author's statement, and adheres to the word and, having obtained the shadow instead of the body, composes books. And this is like saying that he twists ropes of sand and builds houses therefrom to make I do not know what, unless it is a monument and a memorial — the former, an advertisement of his folly the latter, a declaration of the struggle he undertook against his own salvation. This being so, we condemn the doctrines themselves together with their authors, and judge that their memory, like the expelled, be eliminated from the Church with a resounding noise.
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